Two agents participate in a tournament that has two stages: intermediate and final. The results of the intermediate stage are privately observed by the principal who organizes the tournament. Prizes for the winner and the loser are exogenously given, but the principal can enhance effort...

Firms often combine career concerns based incentives with incentives created through relational performance contracts. In this context, disclosure of worker's productivity information enhances career concerns based incentives, but may reduce the firm's ability to sustain relational contracts....

We consider the plant location decision of a multinational corporation (MNC), which has the option to invest in a more or in a less technologically lagging country, and which aims to use its foreign plant as an export-platform. We show that the plant location decision of the MNC depends on...

We study the implications of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly in which firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations, without and with credit rationing, i.e., with a binding credit limit. When there is credit...

It is believed that market power of the input supplier, charging a linear price, is detrimental for the consumers since it creates the double marginalisation problem. We show that this view may not be true if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to reduce rent extraction by the input...

We show that the presence of a strategic tax policy increases the incentive for a horizontal merger compared to the situation with no tax policy. Thus, we point towards a new factor, viz., strategic tax policy, for increasing the incentive for a horizontal merger that has been ignored in the...