Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

This paper compares profits and consumer surplus under non-cooperation and collusion in the product market when the firms have the option for R&D before production. We show that whether R&D investment would be higher under non-cooperation or product market collusion depends on the R\&D...

This paper compares profits and consumer surplus under non-cooperation and collusion in the product market when the firms have the option for R&D before production. We show that whether R&D investment would be higher under noncooperation or product market collusion depends on the R&D...

We consider the effects of product market cooperation on R&Dinvestment, profits, consumer surplus and welfare. We show that though R&Dinvestment, consumer surplus and social welfare may be higher or lower underproduct market cooperation than product market competition, industry profit isalways...

Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage...

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. In contrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product market advantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage in the labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market, Economics Letters, 124: 122-126) show that in a vertically related market Cournot competition yields higher social welfare compared to Bertrand competition if the upstream firm subsidises...