We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger patent protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex‐post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is...

It is generally believed that a weak patent protection makes the consumers and the society better off compared to a strong patent protection by increasing the intensity of competition if the weak patent protection does not affect innovation. We show that this conclusion may not hold if the...

This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending...

We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to thesituation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and alsoproduces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouseis higher than the marginal cost of outside...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending...

Open Science is a dynamic system of knowledge production that depends on the disclosure of knowledge by researchers as an input into knowledge production by future researchers. This paper develops an overlapping generations model of cumulative research to analyze the conditions supporting Open...

We show the effects of the bargaining power of labour unions on product innovation under decentralised and centralised wage bargaining. In this context, we show the implications of preference function, which affects the market size. A higher union bargaining power increases innovation if...