An important discussion in recent years is the introduction of product patentsand the abolition of process patents. In a model with endogenous number of innovatingfirms, we show that whether product patent increases R&D is ambiguous, and depends onthe type of market demand and the cost of R&D....

We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in presence of‘inventing around’ (or imitation) and technology licensing...

The strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) in host countries is often considered to be an important determinant of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Considering FDI to a developing or a newly industrialized country, we show that the host-country firm's innovative activity, which is...

We challenge the common wisdom that patent protection (compared to no or weak patent protection) makes the consumers worse off by reducing product-market competition unless it increases innovation significantly. We show that the absence of patent protection may encourage horizontal merger and...

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is technologically inferior to that of theincumbent then, though licensing reduces (or completely eliminates) excessive entryfor relatively low entry costs, it creates excessive...

We show that a monopolist input supplier licenses its technology to create a second source of input supply if second sourcing increases competition in the final goods market. We also show that welfare increases under second sourcing...