An important discussion in recent years is the introduction of product patentsand the abolition of process patents. In a model with endogenous number of innovatingfirms, we show that whether product patent increases R&D is ambiguous, and depends onthe type of market demand and the cost of R&D....

We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in presence of‘inventing around’ (or imitation) and technology licensing...

The strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) in host countries is often considered to be an important determinant of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Considering FDI to a developing or a newly industrialized country, we show that the host-country firm's innovative activity, which is...

We challenge the common wisdom that patent protection (compared to no or weak patent protection) makes the consumers worse off by reducing product-market competition unless it increases innovation significantly. We show that the absence of patent protection may encourage horizontal merger and...

This paper investigates the effect of different patent regimes on R&D investment and social welfare in a duopoly market with uncertain R&D process. We find that strong patent protection increases R&D investment of at least one firm but whether both firms' R&D investment will be more under strong...

We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger patent protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex‐post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is...

We show that a monopolist final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage...

Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the...

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...