Serfling (2016) examines how the increase in firing costs impacts the capital structure decisions of firms and hypothesizes that higher firing costs of labor lead to a decline in a firm’s financial leverage use by directly increasing its distress costs and indirectly lifting its operating...

A debate exists on the issue of whether a governance system is value additive or even necessary for a privately-held firm. One side of the debate suggests that, in absence of agency problems, a private firm does not need a costly governance system. The other side argues that a private firm...

Morellec, Nikolov, and Schürhoff (2012) predict that a self-interested manager prefers a leverage level that is lower than the shareholders' desired level, and effective corporate governance encourages timely capital structure rebalancing. In a U.S. sample during 1996-2008, we confirm that both...

As a firm deviates from its target leverage, marginal bankruptcy costs change at a faster speed than marginal tax shield. This renders the speed of adjustment (SOA) of capital structure an increasing function of the starting deviation from the target. Adopting a bootstrapping-based estimation,...

Serfling (2016) examines how the increase in firing costs impacts the capital structure decisions of firms and hypothesizes that higher firing costs of labor lead to a decline in a firm’s financial leverage use by directly increasing its distress costs and indirectly lifting its operating...

Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports a negative relation between the strictness of labor protection laws and a firm’s financial leverage. Given the unique economic and financial environments in China, we examine if the same relationship applies to Chinese firms after the enactment of the...