We model how three groups--insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors, and entrepreneurs planning to take firms public--compete for influence over politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify factors that push toward suboptimal investor protection,...

We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, three groups - insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future - compete for influence...

We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the...

We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the...