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Independent safety controls with moral hazard
Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 158 (2002) 3, pp. 408-419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001705546
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The manager and the auditor in a double moral hazard setting : efficiency through contingent fees and insurance contracts
Feess, Eberhard - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013444377
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Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation : the welfare increasing effect of liability insurance
Ewert, Ralf; Feess, Eberhard; Nell, Martin - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013444382