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Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?
Bartling, Björn; Gesche, Tobias; Netzer, Nick - 2016
second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second- price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced … bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model …-price auctions in which human sellers are absent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456510
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2016 - Revised version
-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471404
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2015 - Revised version, November 2015
secondprice-auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation … bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014, First version: November 2013
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030
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An Externality-Robust Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn - 2016
-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006530
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Does the Absence of Human Sellers Bias Bidding Behavior in Auction Experiments?
Bartling, Björn - 2017
-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second-price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation … bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have … conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969424
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An Externality-Robust Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2016
-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151381
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An Externality-Robust Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn - 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
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An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817290