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This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921779
This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158242
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003537257
This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the … and competed with computerized bids. Three treatments were considered which varied with the conditions of information … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263057
mechanisms are often employed to extract the information on companies' abilities and to allocate licenses efficiently. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332345
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003654477
mechanisms are often employed to extract the information on companies’ abilities and to allocate licenses efficiently. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003246504
We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences accommodating imperfect transferability of utility and income effects. In such a model, there is a minimum price equilibrium. We establish the structural...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826424
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138483
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698