Based on an axiomatically derived provision rule allowing community members to endogenously determine which, if any, public project should be provided, we perform experiments where (i) not all parties benefit from provision, and (ii) the projects' costs can be negative. In the tradition of legal...

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or...

We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion differs across nations when control- ling for actual country differences in labor supply responses. Towards this aim, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive margins for 17 EU countries and the US. Using the same...

Whether observed differences in redistributive policies across countries are the result of differences in social preferences or efficiency constraints is an important question that paves the debate about the optimality of welfare regimes. To shed new light on this question, we estimate labor...

How malleable are people´s fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent people´s allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether people´s fairness ideals vary...

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects´ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...

This paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mechanism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experiments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is...

Previous studies have shown that other-regarding concerns are weakened under risky situations. Daily experience also suggests that people care more about an identifiable than about an unidentifiable third person. We report on an experiment designed to explore whether rendering the other...

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...

In a model in which agents differ in wages and preferences over labor time-consumption bundles, we study labor income tax schemes that alleviate poverty. To avoid conflict with individual well-being, we require redistribution to take place between agents on both sides of the poverty line...