By using the recent Gertler and Kiyotaki's (2010) setup, this paper explores the interaction between real distortions stemming from the labor market institutions and financial shocks. We find that neither labor market imperfections nor fiscal institutions determining tax wedges have an impact on...

By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and conflict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games.

L’ambiente per sua natura è un bene pubblico e la sua tutela richiede, quindi, qualche tipo d’intervento. L’uso delle risorse naturali per attività economiche, anziché a fini di protezione ambientale, ad esempio, può essere regolato a livello di comunità locale per evitare un...

In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the...

This paper shows the relationship between static controllability (the well-known Tinbergen golden rule), and the existence and other properties of the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic setting with rational expectations for future behavior. We show how to determine the existence of equilibrium...

This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Frisch, Hansen, Tinbergen and Theil to situations of strategic interaction. Andrew Hughes Hallett has taken an active and relevant part in this evolution, having contributed to both the...

The paper extensively studies the static model of non-cooperative linear quadratic games in which a set of agents chooses their instruments strategically to minimize their linear quadratic criterion. We first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium...

The paper studies the relationship between equilibrium existence in LQ games and the classical theory of economic policy, generalizing some recent results. In particular, by focusing on system controllability instead of the controllability by one or some of the players, we find conditions for...

We show that rational expectations do not affect the controllability of an economic system, either in its static or in its dynamic version, even though their introduction in many other circumstances may make it impossible for the policymaker to affect certain variables due to policy invariance,...