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Vertical integration with capital precommitment : monopolization vs. long-run inefficiency
Baake, Pio; Kamecke, Ulrich; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001562068
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A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2010
We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences - inequality aversion - using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008667623
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Belief elicitation in experiments : is there a hedging problem?
Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Koch, Alexander K.; … - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 13 (2010) 4, pp. 412-438
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009298606
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Belief elicitation in experiments : is there a hedging problem?
Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Koch, Alexander K.; … - 2008
stated beliefs against adverse outcomes of other decisions in the experiment. This raises two questions: (i) can we trust the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003719630
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001485541
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
In this experiment, the authors analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duooly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489460
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: International journal of industrial organization 22 (2004) 4, pp. 561-574
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002010105
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
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Strategic Delegation In Experimental Markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2005
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts, which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069988
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Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2021
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321092