Showing 1 - 10 of 131
contributions increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare … improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775824
rates and welfare improvements. Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation found …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064137
artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the … prisoner’s dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely … also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543708
We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307240
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929112
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010397752
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010426996
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310323
We explore whether buyer groups, in which firms legally purchase inputs jointly, facilitate collusion in the product market. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms from them constitute more severe credible threats, hence, in theory buyer groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009661278
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724