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Hybrid Collusion : Algorithmic Pricing in Human-Computer Laboratory Markets

Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin - 2021

We investigate collusive pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions to an algorithm. We further vary whether participants...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228135

Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion

Normann, Hans-Theo - 2008

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003861823

Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion

Normann, Hans-Theo - In: European economic review : EER 53 (2009) 4, pp. 461-480

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854513

Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs : experimental evidence

Normann, Hans-Theo - 2010

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008666950

Mergers, asymmetries and collusion : experimental evidence

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 118 (2008), pp. 387-400

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003679199

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 109 (2015), pp. 72-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011396765

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2012

We explore whether buyer groups, in which firms legally purchase inputs jointly, facilitate collusion in the product market. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms from them constitute more severe credible threats, hence, in theory buyer groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009661278

Explicit vs. tacit collusion : the impact of communication in oligopoly experiments

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: European economic review : EER 56 (2012) 8, pp. 1759-1772

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706419

Endogenous cartel formation : experimental evidence

Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2014

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they … gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010401724

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - 2014 - [Rev.] November 2014

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428107