This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player's income. The data show that contributions increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness....

We examine repeated Cournot oligopolies when there is uncertainty about the number of players. Already in the static game, such uncertainty can imply outputs above Nash. For the repeated game, we argue that the uncertainty may lead to a novel strategy, based on a notion of limited depth of...

Der diesjährige Nobelpreis für Ökonomie ging an einen Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, der sich mit dem Wettbewerb auf Märkten und der Regulierung von Unternehmen befasst und dies solide - auch spieltheoretisch - fundiert. Jean Tirole hat allerdings ein sehr breites Forschungsspektrum, das Fragen...

Der diesjährige Nobelpreis für Ökonomie ging an einen Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, der sich mit dem Wettbewerb auf Märkten und der Regulierung von Unternehmen befasst und dies solide – auch spieltheoretisch – fundiert. Jean Tirole hat allerdings ein sehr breites Forschungsspektrum, das...

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that,...

When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstream firms, it may fail to monopolize the market because of opportunistic behavior towards the downstream firms. We analyze this well-known commitment problem in an experiment where we extend previous research by allowing for...

An allocation rule that prioritizes registered donors increases the willingness to register for organ donation, as laboratory experiments show. In public opinion, however, this priority rule faces repugnance. We explore the discrepancy by implementing a vote on the rule in a donation experiment,...

We explore how competition affects firms obfuscation strategies in laboratory experiments. Firms sell a base good and an add-on product. The price of the add-on may be shrouded and, if so, myopic consumers pay too much. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our...

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payo , it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...