We motivate and provide an overview to New Monetarist Economics. We then briefly describe the individual contributions to the <italic>Macroeconomics Dynamics</italic> special issues on money, credit, and liquidity.

We motivate and provide an overview to New Monetarist Economics. We then briefly describe the individual contributions to the Macroeconomics Dynamics special issues on money, credit and liquidity.

The 2010 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance met at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago this summer, for the second year. The following document summarizes and ties together the papers presented.

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium...

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium...

The 2010 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance met at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago this summer, for the second year. The following document summarizes and ties together the papers presented.

We motivate and provide an overview to New Monetarist Economics. We then briefly describe the individual contributions to the Macroeconomics Dynamics special issues on money, credit and liquidity.

Are financial intermediaries inherently unstable? If so, why? What does this suggest about government intervention? To address these issues we analyze whether model economies with financial intermediation are particularly prone to multiple, cyclic, or stochastic equilibria. Four formalizations...

A classic result in the theory of implicit contract models with asymmetric information is that “underemployment” results if and only if leisure is an inferior good. We introduce household production into the standard implicit contract model and show that we can have underemployment at the...

A classic result in the theory of labor contracts with asymmetric information is that underemployment results if and only if leisure is an inferior good. A classic result in models where unemployment occurs because of indivisibilities, including implicit contract models and some equilibrium...