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We study the effects of voluntary participation on public good provision. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through two mechanisms: an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504597
We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535527
We study the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation in collective action problems. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434271
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011474825
We study the effects of voluntary participation on cooperation in collective action problems. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through a mechanism of assortative selection of interaction partners based on false consensus bias, or through a mechanism whereby the decision to not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691199
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926097
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010236532
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824722
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003839118
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699717