Showing 1 - 10 of 200
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392425
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282212
We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual's cooperativeness and the individual's beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003898818
observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434301
observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449225
We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012765318
observed to act in isolation from each other. In this paper we use a large-scale dictator game experiment (N = 850) to show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659355
experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our … preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649821
We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common … identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher … than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two further treatments we study the effects of heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535527
We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common … identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher … than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two further treatments we study the effects of heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392438