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Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001780844
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Arrow's theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
Ehlers, Lars H.; Storcken, Ton - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647648
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Collective choice rules on convex restricted domains
Storcken, Ton - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003808603
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On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
Peters, Hans J. M.; Roy, Souvik; Storcken, Ton - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003938628
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Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences
Peters, Hans J. M.; Roy, Souvik; Storcken, Ton - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008749581
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Minimal manipulability : anonymity and unanimity
Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans; Storcken, Ton - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002149165
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Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001793618
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Minimal manipulability : unanimity and nondictatorship
Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002016840
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Minimal manipulability : anonymity and surjectivity
Maus, Stefan; Peters, Hans J. M.; Storcken, Ton - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002016859
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Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
Peters, Hans J. M.; Stel, Hans van der; Storcken, Ton - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000852034