This paper examines the effect of R&D leadership on Research Joint Venture formation. If firms compete in R&D, there is a first (second)-mover advantage, when spillovers are relatively low (high). RJV profits exceed those of R&D leadership, except for a very narrow range of low unit R&D costs...

This paper analyses the desirability of RJV formation when firms may choose their R&D investment before or after any demand uncertainty is resolved. If a R&D leader accommodates a follower, multiple Nash equilibria are possible under both R&D competition and RJV formation. If a R&D leader...

This paper examines a one-shot game where two symmetric incumbents are faced with possible entry into an industry, where firms may differ in the efficiency of R&D in reducing marginal production costs. The decision facing the incumbents is whether to compete at the R&D stage or to form a RJV....

This paper analyses the incentives of incumbent firms to form a first-mover RJV when faced with possible entry. If entry is accommodated, firms’ relative profits under R&D competition and RJV formation depend on R&D spillovers and firms’ R&D efficiency. RJV formation may make entry...

This paper is concerned with comparing adversarial with co-operative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. Because the government cannot commit to...