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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827883
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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
McLean, Rich; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828001
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Folk Theorem with Communication
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828057
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The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828070
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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828087
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Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828089
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Endogenous Monitoring
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828094
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Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games
Kandori, Michihiro; Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359163
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Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration
Cai, Hongbin; Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359191
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Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori)
Obara, Ichiro - UCLA Department of Economics - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359285