We study a classic mechanism design problem: How to organize trade between two privately informed parties. We characterize an optimal mechanism under selfish preferences and present experimental evidence that, under such a mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of individuals deviates from the...

The EU steps up its efforts to curb its territorial CO2-emissions. It is planning to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to level the playing field and to raise own resources. However, unilateral European climate policy action, whether shored up with a CBAM or not, can only...

We study a classic mechanism design problem: How to organize trade between two privately informed parties. We characterize an optimal mechanism under selfish preferences and present experimental evidence that, under such a mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of individuals deviates from the...

We study a classic mechanism design problem: How to organize trade between two privately informed parties. We characterize an optimal mechanism under selfish preferences and present experimental evidence that, under such a mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of individuals deviates from the...

The EU steps up its efforts to curb its territorial CO2-emissions. It is planning to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to level the playing field and to raise own resources. However, unilateral European climate policy action, whether shored up with a CBAM or not, can only...

"ECONtribute: Markets & Public Policy", gegründet 2019 als gemeinsamer Cluster der Universitäten Bonn und Köln, ist der einzige im Kern wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Exzellenzcluster in Deutschland. Seine Agenda zielt nicht ausschließlich auf Fortschritte in der akademischen...

"ECONtribute: Markets & Public Policy", gegründet 2019 als gemeinsamer Cluster der Universitäten Bonn und Köln, ist der einzige im Kern wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Exzellenzcluster in Deutschland. Seine Agenda zielt nicht ausschließlich auf Fortschritte in der akademischen...

We study a classic mechanism design problem: How to organize trade between two privately informed parties. We characterize an optimal mechanism under selfish preferences and present experimental evidence that, under such a mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of individuals deviates from the...