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An experiment on supply function competition
Bolle, Friedel; Grimm, Veronika; Ockenfels, Axel; del … - In: European Economic Review 63 (2013) C, pp. 170-185
We experimentally investigate key predictions of supply function equilibrium. While, overall, equilibrium organizes bidding behavior well, we observe three important deviations. First, bidding is sensitive to theoretically irrelevant changes of the demand distribution. Second, in a market with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702962
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More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not
Ockenfels, Axel; Gallier, Carlo; Sturm, Bodo - 2024
International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015211854
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The dynamic interplay of inequality and trust: an experimental study
Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter - 2007
We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, in which trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over time. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264271
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The dynamic interplay of inequality and trust—An experimental study
Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012) 2, pp. 355-365
We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic growth game, in which trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the laboratory economy in the future. We find that trust (as measured by the percentage of wealth invested in a trust game) is initially high in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048177
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The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust - An Experimental Study
Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter - Harvard Business School, Harvard University - 2007
We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, where trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over time. In a treatment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005754938
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The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust - An Experimental Study
Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter - Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und … - 2007
We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, where trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over time. In a treatment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704393
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More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not
Gallier, Carlo; Ockenfels, Axel; Sturm, Bodo - 2024
International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271325
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Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions : theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E. - 2003
their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that … show that sniping in a fixed deadline auction can occur even at equilibrium in auctions with private values, as well as in … that apply the automatic extension rule. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the field data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011508091
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Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions : Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
Ockenfels, Axel; Roth, Alvin E. - 2021
their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that … show that sniping in a fixed deadline auction can occur even at equilibrium in auctions with private values, as well as in … that apply the automatic extension rule. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the field data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319851
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The Dynamic Interplay of Inequality and Trust – An Experimental Study
Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter - CESifo - 2007
We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, in which trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over time. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416497