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Incentives for Subjects in Internet Experiments

Schipper, Burkhard C.; Oechssler, Jörg - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2008

Internet experiments are a new and convenient way for reaching a large subject pool. Yet, providing incentives to subjects can be a tricky design issue. One cost effective and simple method is the publication of a high score (as in computer games). We test whether a high score provides adequate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008620358

Hierarchy, coercion, and exploitation: An experimental analysis

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Oechssler, Jörg; Shah, Anwar - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 97 (2014) C, pp. 155-168

The power to coerce workers is important for the efficient operation of hierarchically structured organizations. However, this power can also be used by managers to exploit their subordinates for their own benefit. We examine the relationship between the power to coerce and exploitation in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048106

Hierarchy, Coercion, and Exploitation : An Experimental Analysis

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Oechssler, Jörg; Shah, Anwar - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014

The power to coerce workers is important for the e¢ cient operation of hierarchically structured organizations. However, this power can also be used by managers to exploit their subordinates for their own benefit. We examine the relationship between the power to coerce and exploitation in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161042

Imitation under stress

Buckert, Magdalena; Oechssler, Jörg; Schwieren, Christiane - Abteilung "Ökonomik des Wandels", Wissenschaftszentrum … - 2014

Imitating the best strategy from the previous period has been shown to be an important heuristic, in particular in relatively complex environments. In this experiment we test whether subjects are more likely to use imitation if they are under stress. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099970

Through trial & error to collusion

Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jörg; Normann, Hans-Theo - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1999

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983493

On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models

Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983687

Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1998

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983796

Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case

Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Jörg; Riedel, Frank - 2005

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria based on Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used … functions, the set of rest points of the dynamics coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the underlying game. We also … study the asymptotic stability properties of rest points. While strict Nash equilibria may be unstable, we identify …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261668

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Jörg; … - 2005

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263153

Incentives for subjects in internet experiments

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266412