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Finitely repeated games with social preferences

Oechssler, Jörg - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008916027

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 88-96

duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049802

Loss of commitment? An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Jörg; Schlag, Karl H. - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 1997

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983849

Unbeatable Imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422207

Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422214