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How risk sharing may enhance efficiency in English auctions
Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang - 2014
be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences, and (iii) the auction can have a binding … reserve price. Our analysis reveals that the premium has an intricate joint effect on risk sharing and expected revenue, which … in general benefits risk averse bidders. When the seller is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder - a condition often …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234599
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Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - 2000
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324705
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Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions
Goeree, Jacob; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2004
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325228
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Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Ziegler, Andreas - In: Quantitative Economics 13 (2022) 2, pp. 787-823
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536889
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Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Ziegler, Andreas - 2020
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427171
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How Risk Sharing may enhance Efficiency in English Auctions
Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang - 2014
seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences, and (iii) the auction can have a binding … reserve price. Our analysis reveals that the premium has an intricate joint effect on risk sharing and expected revenue, which … in general benefits risk averse bidders. When the seller is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder -a condition often …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377187
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Efficiency in auctions with private and common values : an experimental study
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - 2000
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303292
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Competitive bidding in auctions with private and common values
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - 2000
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303293
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Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions
Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2004
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342575
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Why are open ascending auctions popular? : the role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Ziegler, Andreas - 2020
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427695