In this paper we consider a simple duopoly market in which a home firm and a foreign firm use labor to produce an identical product and supply it to the home market. Firms emit pollution as a by-product of production. We show conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases...

We use a Ricardian model with continuum of goods to study the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined ranges of non-traded, exported, and imported goods. We show that if technical progress is unbiased (biased toward the goods that a country has more comparative advantage),...

We explore the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined range of non-traded goods by using a Ricardian model with continuum of goods. By defining technical progress on the basis of proportional changes in the relative productivity across sectors, we show that the range of...

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution and study in a holistic way the environmental policies, whereby government sets up emission caps and sells emission permits at a competitive price which can be viewed as an emission tax. Then, it uses the collected tax revenues to...

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12023-abs-0001" <p>In the context of a simple model of strategic offshoring, we investigate the reasons why firms may simultaneously source fragments domestically and internationally. We explore the impacts of offshoring on the production pattern of finished goods, tradable...</p>

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12047-abs-0001" <p>We construct a general equilibrium model of urban unemployment with a continuum of heterogeneous urban firms producing differentiated products in a monopolistic competitive market. We introduce a notion of pattern of technical progress among the...</p>

We provide an analysis of the impact of migration on the skilled- unskilled wage gap. In particular, we show the possibility of a rise in the wage gap following the migration of skilled (unskilled ) labor.

We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom.