We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List's (2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent...

We introduce a novel approach for organizing behavior and explaining cooperation in repeated games. Our approach is based on the idea that players differ according to an inherent propensity to cooperate that systematically affects behavior and cooperation levels. We formulate the empirical...

We report an experiment that evaluates three market-based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a Òfixed-triggerÓ regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion, a ÒregulatorÓ regime, where regulators make conversion decisions based on...

This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matching or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing....

We design an experiment to test whether the behavior of dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment that allows for observable differences in behavior depending upon whether pure or...

We report a market experiment that examines the capacity of price and information frictions to explain real responses to nominal price shocks. As predicted by the standard dynamic adjustment models, we find that both price and information frictions impede the response to a nominal shock. We also...

This paper reviews the analysis of the threshold autoregressive, smooth threshold autoregressive, and Markov switching autoregressive models from the Bayesian perspective. For each model we start by describing a baseline model and discussing possible extensions and applications. Then we review...

We study the effects of price signaling activity and underlying propensities to cooperate on tacit collusion in posted offer markets. The primary experiment consists of an extensively repeated baseline sequence and a 'forecast' sequence that adds to the baseline a forecasting game that allows...

In the typical dictator game, the majority of dictators choose to pass at least a portion of their endowment to recipients who are given no endowment. We modify the dictator game by giving the recipient an endowment. We then measure the impact of varying the recipient’s endowment on the amount...