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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2011
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
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Bidding to give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it right from the Start
Onderstal, Sander; Schram, Arthur J.C.; Soetevent, … - 2011
approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325653
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Auctioning incentive contracts : an experimental study
Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur van de - 2009
-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379431
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Bidding to give in the field
Onderstal, Sander; Schram, J. H. C.; Soetevent, Adriaan R. - In: Journal of public economics 105 (2013), pp. 72-85
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792652
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Reprint of: Bidding to give in the field
Onderstal, Sander; Schram, Arthur; Soetevent, Adriaan R. - In: Journal of public economics 114 (2014), pp. 87-100
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491074
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If you pay peanuts ... : a laboratory experiment on reward schemes in employment service contracting
Meerendonk, Arthur van de; Onderstal, Sander - In: European journal of social security 12 (2010) 4, pp. 272-288
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008935634
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Bidding to give: an experimental comparison of auctions for charity
Schram, Arthur; Onderstal, Sander - In: International economic review 50 (2009) 2, pp. 431-457
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003843059
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Inverse adverse selection : the market for gems
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2010
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
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Keeping out Trojan horses : auctions and bankruptcy in the laboratory
Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - 2011
laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English … auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly reject our theoretical prediction that the English auction leads to less … aggressive bids and fewer bankruptcies than the first-price sealed-bid auction. X-cursedness gives a robust explanation of our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
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Bidding to give in the field : door-to-door fundraisers had it right from the start
Onderstal, Sander; Schram, Arthur J. C.; Soetevent, … - 2011
approached about 4500 households, each participating in either an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary … contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households competed for a prize in the all-pay auction … and the lottery. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011386444