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Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence

Damania, Richard; Fredriksson, Per G.; Osang, Thomas - In: Southern Economic Journal 72 (2005) 1, pp. 167-185

We suggest a new perspective on firms' ability to organize collective action. We argue that industries that face a greater number of regulations have an easier time forming a lobby group and sustaining joint lobbying efforts. In particular, firms in industries that are pollution intensive, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005548533

Collusion, collective action and protection : theory and evidence

Damania, Richard; Fredriksson, Per; Osang, Thomas - In: Public choice 121 (2004) 3/4, pp. 279-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002505900

Polluters and collective action : theory and evidence

Damania, Richard; Fredriksson, Per; Osang, Thomas - In: Southern economic journal 72 (2005) 1, pp. 167-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003081023

Polluters and Collective Action: Theory and Evidence

Damania, Richard; Fredriksson, Per G.; Osang, Thomas - In: Southern economic journal 72 (2005) 1, pp. 167-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006643214

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

Damania, Richard; Fredriksson, Per G.; Osang, Thomas - In: Public choice 121 (2004) 3-4, pp. 279-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006550236