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The package assignment model
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M. - In: Journal of economic theory 107 (2002) 2, pp. 377-406
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001728056
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Ascending price Vickrey auctions
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M. - In: Games and economic behavior 55 (2006) 2, pp. 215-241
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003327681
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Perfect competition as the blueprint for efficiency and incentive compatibility
Makowski, Louis; Ostroy, Joseph M.; Segal, Uzi - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000941612
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No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
Ostroy, Joseph M.; Segal, Uzi - In: Social choice and welfare 39 (2012) 4, pp. 697-719
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633467
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No externalities : a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
Ostroy, Joseph M.; Segal, Uzi - 2010
We show that efficient anonymous incentive compatible (dominant strategy) mechanisms for public goods eliminate externalities, i.e., each individual is unable to change the welfare of anyone else. The characterization is used to derive existence and non-existence results for models with a finite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008857742
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Ascending price Vickrey auctions
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 55 (2006) 2, pp. 215-241
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413691
Cover Image
The Package Assignment Model
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 107 (2002) 2, pp. 377-406
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153414
Cover Image
Ascending price Vickrey auctions
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M. - In: Games and economic behavior 55 (2006) 2, pp. 215-241
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008222623
Cover Image
The Package Assignment Model
Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M. - In: Journal of economic theory 107 (2002) 2, pp. 377-406
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007659410
Cover Image
No Externalities: A Characterization of Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility with Public Goods
Segal, Uzi; Ostroy, Joseph M. - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2010
We show that efficient anonymous incentive compatible (dominant strategy) mechanisms for public goods eliminate externalities, i.e., each individual is unable to change the welfare of anyone else. The characterization is used to derive existence and non-existence results for models with a finite...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783615