Showing 1 - 10 of 100
If the private benefits of control are high and management owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural … allies. There are two forces at play. First, managers effectively transform employees into a “poison pill’’ by signing … squires’’ for the incumbent managers, lobbying against hostile takeovers to protect the high wages enjoyed under incumbent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802034
The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124338
This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839186
If management has high private benefits and owns a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against … a takeover threat. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a "shark repellent" through long …''\ for the incumbent managers: to protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers, by refusing to sell their shares …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801007
We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626741
The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ‘corporatist’ agreement is feasible if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907
This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789093
We analyze how the law and its enforcement affect equity market equilibrium. Improvements in the legal system, while invariably associated with broader equity markets, have different effects on equity returns depending on the institutional change considered and on the degree of international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839176
Recent work documents that better legal institutions are associated with broader equity markets. We investigate whether international differences in legal institutions also help explain the international cross-section of expected stock returns. We document three main regularities. First, total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123538
Recent work documents that better legal institutions are associated with broader equity markets. We investigate whether international differences in legal institutions also help explain the international cross-section of expected stock returns. We document three main regularities. First, total...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626755