We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...

Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via...

Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via...

In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition...

Prior economic research is very critical about family CEOs and family management. Nepotism, altruism, lower managerial abilities, and a small pool of qualified family candidates are cited as reasons that speak against family management. Still, the empirical reality is different. A surprisingly...

Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via...

Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via...

We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents' types in the population. The resulting nonlinear dynamic...

We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...

A central result in the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information is that the uninformed party (buyer) can screen the informed party (seller) over time. Screening eliminates trade failures that are otherwise common in the presence of adverse selection, but the downside of the...