We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy … market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the …

voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo in period t+1. We study symmetric Markov equilibria of the resulting game … alternative, and the discount factor (committee impatience). We report several new findings. Voting behavior is selfish and myopic …

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy … market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the …

The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary … voting with non-storable votes. The equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive feature ­the number of votes cast must be … implementation. In our experiments, realized efficiency levels were remarkably close to theoretical equilibrium predictions, while …