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The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of worldwide efforts to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision. However, the crisis that started in 2007?08 was a crude awakening: several of these improvements seemed unable to avoid or mitigate the crisis. This paper brings the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009370541
Since the mid-1990s worldwide efforts were undertaken to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision, through modifications in the architecture and governance. Did these improvements mitigate the 2008–2009 Crisis? This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of three main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011046543
On May 11-12, 2011, SUERF, the Belgian Financial Forum, the Brussels Finance Institute and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) jointly organised the 29th SUERF Colloquium New paradigms in money and finance? The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011070913
This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011182825
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550298
We empirically investigate whether central bank independence (CBI) and the monetary policy setting can jointly influence the likelihood that policymakers assign banking supervision to central banks. We find that, conditional on the government being a benevolent one, higher central bank...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141031
We investigate the reasons that induce policymakers to assign banking supervision to central banks rather than involving authorities outside the banking sector. On the one hand, empirical results provide evidence that policymakers prefer that, conditional on several known features affecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148311