Showing 1 - 10 of 17
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001753229
We characterize the optimal incentive scheme for a manager who faces costly effort decisions and whose ability to generate profits for the firm varies stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem with hidden actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142525
We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142559
We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665252
We characterize the firm's optimal contract for a manager who faces costly effort decisions and whose ability to generate profits for the firm changes stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem with hidden actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665264
I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent's type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665285
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
This paper illustrates the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779201
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779206
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions of the downstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003231416