We propose a robust solution concept for Bayesian persuasion thataccounts for the Sender's concern that her Bayesian belief about theenvironment---which we call the conjecture---may be false.Specifically, the Sender is uncertain about the exogenous sourcesof information the Receivers may learn...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide whether or not to “attack” a status-quo. The designer does not trust the agents to play favourably...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...

This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to...

This paper illustrates the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the...

I study the properties of optimal long-term contracts in an environment in which the agent.s type evolves stochastically over time. The model stylizes a buyer-seller relationship but the results apply quite naturally to many contractual situations including regulation and optimal...

This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions of the downstream...