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Liability Standards with an Uncertain Outcome at Trial

Farmer, Amy - 2014

under the negligence standard approaches the outcome under strict liability. The level of care which may be achieved under … the negligence standard is (asymptotically) at least as high as under strict liability and may be higher. Consequently …, the level of social welfare under an optimally chosen negligence standard is at least as high as under strict liability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053723

Litigation with default judgments

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 10 (2014) 2, pp. 117-136

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384341

Litigation with judgment proof defendants

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: International review of law and economics 49 (2017), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011821090

Litigation with Judgment Proof Defendants

Farmer, Amy - 2015

We consider a model of litigation in which some defendants have insufficient assets to pay a judgment at trial. Because the defendant's assets are not observable, this serves as a source of asymmetric information which leads to trials in the equilibrium of the model. Unlike many other types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029371

Negative Expected Value Suits in a Signaling Model

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Southern Economic Journal 74 (2007) 2, pp. 434-447

We extend the 1986 signaling model of Reinganum and Wilde by allowing for the possibility of negative expected value (NEV) suits. If filing costs are zero, the equilibrium consistent with the D1 refinement implies that settlement offers face a rejection rate of 100%. If filing costs are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005738791

Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Southern Economic Journal 71 (2005) 3, pp. 566-581

We analyze contingency fees in the Reinganum and Wilde (1986) signaling model of litigation. The effect of contingency fees on settlement depends on the details of the contingency fee contract and the nature of the informational asymmetry assumed in the model. Introducing bifurcated fee...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005562246

Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information: Unilateral versus Bilateral Payoff Relevance

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Southern Economic Journal 77 (2010) 2, pp. 369-384

Asymmetric information is a leading explanation for settlement failure that results in a costly trial. Typically, the information in question is assumed to have bilateral payoff relevance, meaning it affects the expected payoffs of both the plaintiff and defendant. When there is bilateral payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421447

An Empirical Analysis of the Signaling and Screening Models of Litigation

Pecorino, Paul; van Boening, Mark - 2016

We present an experimental analysis of the signaling and screening models of litigation. In both models, bargaining failure is driven by asymmetric information. The difference between the models lies in the bargaining structure: In the signaling game, the informed party makes the final offer,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173918

Pretrial Signaling with Negative Expected Value Suits

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - 2002

We extend the signaling model of Reinganum and Wilde (1986) by allowing for the possibility of negative expected value (NEV) suits. If filing costs are positive, then there exists a separating equilibrium such that plaintiffs with NEV suits choose not to file. By making the filing decision...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113668

Pretrial bargaining with asymmetric information : unilateral versus bilateral payoff relevance

Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - In: Southern economic journal 77 (2010) 2, pp. 369-384

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008735726