Launching and stimulating competition in telecommunications markets is an important policy goal. It contains two elements: to encourage entry and to make competition effective such that consumers benefit. The first one requires that entrants can make profits after investing in infrastructure so...

We analyze a repeated setting of an asymmetric, differentiated telecommunications market with an incumbent and an entrant. The entrant may roll out its own network or use parts of the incumbent's network. The incumbent is established in the market, while the entrant gradually builds up a track...

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology, which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights, to quantify the coordinated...

In this paper we investigate the anti-competitive effects of partial horizontal ownership in a setting where: (i) two cost-asymmetric firms compete à la Cournot; (ii) managers deal with eventual conflicting interests of the different shareholders by maximizing a weighted sum of firms' operating...

Launching and stimulating competition in telecommunications markets is an important policy goal. It contains two elements: to encourage entry and to make competition effective such that consumers benefit. The first one requires that entrants can make profits after investing in infrastructure so...

The introduction of packet-switched telephony in the form of VoIP raises concerns about current regulatory practice. Access regulation has been designed for traditional telephony on PSTN networks. In this paper we analyze the effect of access regulation of PSTN networks on the adoption of a new...

Only recently, competition authorities tend to see comparative advertising as helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work,...

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor's network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that...