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Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality

Belleflamme, Paul; Peitz, Martin - In: European economic review : EER 66 (2014), pp. 127-143

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423083

Umbrella branding and the provision of quality

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2006

Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881

You are judged by the company you keep : reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - 2016

has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The supplier may enter the market by … initially renting the downstream rm s reputation. The downstream rm may optimally source its input externally, even though … reputation, it may su¤er from a reputational barrier to entry arising from higher input costs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011492196

You are judged by the company you keep: Reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - 2016

downstream rm has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The supplier may enter the … market by initially renting the downstream rms reputation. The downstream rm may optimally source its … in the downstream market may lack reputation, it may su¤er from a reputational barrier to entry arising from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011588686

You are judged by the company you keep : reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011494211

You are judged by the company you keep : reputation leverage in vertically related markets

Choi, Jay Pil; Peitz, Martin - In: International journal of industrial organization 61 (2018), pp. 351-379

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103441

Umbrella branding and external certification

Hakenes, Hendrik (contributor); Peitz, Martin (contributor) - 2008

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730661

Alliances between competitors and consumer information

Garella, Paolo G. (contributor); Peitz, Martin (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783122

With a little help from my enemy : comparative advertising as a signal of quality

Barigozzi, Francesca (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003784277

Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality

Belleflamme, Paul; Peitz, Martin - 2009

In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003833301