We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE....

Solutions defined on classes of strategic games, satisfying One-Person Rationality (OPR), Non-emptiness (NEM) and Consistency (CONS) are considered. The main question to be answered is whether these conditions characterize the Nash Equilibrium solution NE for the given class of games. Depending...

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...