instruments available to the regulator when intervening with banks that are capital inadequate and investigates the … closure rules when recapitalization is costly. In the model banks are able to manage their portfolios dynamically and their … costs as well as the benefits of capital regulation and to accommodate the behavioral response of banks in terms of their …

instruments available to the regulator when intervening with banks that are capital inadequate and investigates the … closure rules when recapitalization is costly. In the model banks are able to manage their portfolios dynamically and their … costs as well as the benefits of capital regulation and to accommodate the behavioral response of banks in terms of their …

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self-insurance), by participating in interbank … to show that undiversi fiable liquidity risk, i.e. the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank … liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that empirically banks that are more exposed to undiversifi able liquidity risk are …

. Beyond documenting the observed facts, we analyse four main drivers for the decision to clear: 1) the liquidity and riskiness …

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with … attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments - the empirical distribution of missed payments …