We use an original variant of the standard trust game to study the effects of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third "corrupted" player under different expected costs of...

We examine by means of an artefactual field experiment on a representative sample of Italian adults, the impact of information and belief elicitation on charitable-giving when donors know (or express their beliefs on) what the organizations received in terms of aggregate donations in the past....

We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received by...

In this paper we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on people's charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation...

We investigate players' preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less...

We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod "hybrid contribution" multiplayer prisoner's dilemma called the "vote with the wallet" game. Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we defi ne as...

We use an original variant of the standard trust game, in order to study the effect of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different...

We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received by...

In this paper we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on people's charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation...