In this survey we analyze, and compare, various sufficient epistemic conditions for backward induction that have been proposed in the literature. To this purpose we present a simple epistemic base model for games with perfect information, and translate the different models into the language of...

An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the directrevelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paperprovides characterizations...

A probabilistic belief revision function assigns to every initial probabilistic belief and every observable event some revised probabilistic belief that only attaches positive probability to states in this event. We propose three axioms for belief revision functions: (1) linearity, meaning that...

In this paper we develop an epistemic model for dynamic games in which players may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences (including the opponents'' utility functions) as the game proceeds. Within this framework, we propose a rationalizability concept that is based upon the...

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player...

We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents’ actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we...

In this paper we study three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points – points below which they consider payoffs to be losses – are endogenous to the...

This paper is concerned with a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement mechanism called combinatorial scoring auction. In the setting that we analyze, private information of the suppliers is multi-dimensional. The buyer wants to procure several items at once. Subsets of these items are...