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Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tag, Joacim - CESifo - 2013

antitrust policy, we underscore that an active private equity market can aid antitrust authorities by triggering welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681223

Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim - 2013

antitrust policy, we underscore that an active private equity market can aid antitrust authorities by triggering welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318810

Entrepreneurial Innovations, Competition and Competition Policy

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We construct a model where an entrepreneur could either innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale relative to entry. Increased competition reduces entrants' and acquirers' profits in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497863

Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504295

Buying to sell : private equity buyouts and industrial restructuring

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim - 2013

antitrust policy, we underscore that an active private equity market can aid antitrust authorities by triggering welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772935

Asymmetric Cartels - a Theory of Ring Leaders

Ganslandt, Mattias; Persson, Lars; Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Many convicted cartels have a leader which is substantially larger than its rivals. In a setting where firms face … indivisible costs of collusion, we show that: (i) firms may have an incentive to merge so as to create asymmetric market … higher risk of collusion. Thus, these results have implications for the practice of the current EU and US merger policies. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792412

Entrepreneurial innovations, competition and competition policy

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - In: European Economic Review 56 (2012) 3, pp. 488-506

We construct a model where an entrepreneur can innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product market competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale. Increased competition not only reduces the profits of entrants and the acquirer of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048630

Privatization, Investment and Ownership Efficiency

Friberg, Richard; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - 2008

We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: i) private ownership is more efficient than public ownership, ii) privatizations are associated with increases in efficiency and iii) the increase in efficiency predates the privatization. The two key mechanisms explaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320092

Endogenous Asset Ownership Structures in Deregulated Markets

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - 2003

This paper determines the equilibrium ownership structure in an emerging market deregulated by privatization and investment liberalization. It is shown that bidding competition in the privatization stage is necessary but not sufficient for reaching an efficient equilibrium market structure....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320126

Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - 2003

This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A firm restructuring only takes into account how much its own profit will increase....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320155