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Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gerard; Tabellini, Guido - In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2 (2007) 2, pp. 155-188

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698771

How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792107

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper presents a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136516

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - 2008

We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061818

How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?

Persson, Torsten; Roland, Gérard; Tabellini, Guido - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319527

Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 1, part C, (pp. 1397-1482). 1999

incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and …: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with … fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024218