Similar Search Results

Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Johnson, Phillip; Levine, David K; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - David K. Levine - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827788

Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent

Celentani, Marco; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K; … - David K. Levine - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572741

Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population

Levine, David K; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - David K. Levine - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708150

Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation

Levine, David K; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - David K. Levine - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708189

When Are Agents Negligible?

Levine, David K; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang - In: American Economic Review 85 (1995) 5, pp. 1160-70

The authors examine the following paradox: in a dynamic setting, equilibria can be radically different in a model with a finite number of agents than in a model with a continuum of agents. They present a simple strategic setting in which this paradox is a general phenomenon. However, the paradox...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005241706