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Volunteer work and club size : Nash equilibrium and optimality

Barham, Vicky; Boadway, Robin W.; Marchand, Maurice G.; … - In: Journal of public economics 65 (1997) 1, pp. 9-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001336231

Investment in local public services : Nash equilibrium and social optimum

Cremer, Helmuth - In: Journal of public economics 65 (1997) 1, pp. 23-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001336227

Investment in local public services : Nash equilibrium and social optimum

Kremer, H. - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013452732

Education for attention : a Nash-bargaining solution to the bequest-as-exchange model

Cremer, Helmuth - In: Public finance 48 (1993), pp. 85-97

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001340736

Limiting the number of charities

Pestieau, Pierre (contributor); Sato, Motohiro (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003375893

Charities and the political support for estate taxation

Casamatta, Georges; Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 423-426

We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572190