We assume that individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In the steady state, workers with wages in the intermediate range join the retired persons to form a majority and vote for a positive level of social security. When a shock decreases population growth,...

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity, In such a setting, a redistributive Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The workers with...

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The workers with...

This paper explores the effect of letting individuals choose their retirement age in a world of uncertainty where there exist both defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension plans. The paper shows that giving individuals the flexibility to determine when to retire is an important...