We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of thedisagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate anex ante effciency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfyingthis axiom...

Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that thereare several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with abargaining problem...

This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria foralternatives that are composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplicativecriteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria toobtain new justications of known social...

Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singleplateauedness in a choice-theoretic setting....

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...